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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
GLEN F. HARDING,
Plaintiff and Appellant

vs.
MARY ALLEN,
Defendant and Respondent

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
I.
THE APPEAL
This is an appeal from a judgment of the District
Court of Weber County, Utah, Judge John F. Wahlquist, presiding, tried without a jury. The parties will
be referred to as in the court helow.

II.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This case involves a boundary line dispute. Glen
F. Harding, the owner of some real property on the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Northeast corner of 23rd Street and Ogden A venue,
in Ogden, Utah, and whose north line adjoins the south
line of certain real property owned by Mary .Allen
brought this suit to quiet title to his property as described in his deeds. Plaintiff had purchased his property in two parcels. The first parcel, the west 66 feet
of his property, was purchased from l\iary Weller,
April 7, 1951 (Ex. A, Page 85), and the second parcel,
the east 49.5 feet, was purchased from Joseph H.
Hunter, June 30, 1951 (Ex. B., Page 47).
Defendant Mary Allen purchased her property,
which fronts on Ogden Ave.nue, on D'ecember 11, 1937,
and has occupied the property constantly since that time.
(Tr. 39).
Divid1ng plaintiff and defendant's properties, a
wood fence begins on the east corner of the true common
boundary line, and runs thence some 83 feet westerly,
on a bias to the south; this fence terminates 1.9 feet
south (and on plaintiff's side· of).~.the true boundary
line, and 30 feet short of the western end of the properties. (Ex. C).
At the time defendant originally purchased her
property, there was a fence existing along the same
line as the present f ence, and extending beyond the west
end of the present fence about 4 to 6 feet to a tree.
No evidence was given as to the origin of this fence.
About 1 Y2 years after defendant acquired the property
this tree was lmocked down by a truck, and the west
terminus of the renee reverted to somewhere near its
present location (Tr. 81, 86).
1

During this tin1e, the west section of plaintiff's
2
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proJ><:'rty (the Weller property) was occupied by a
house and garage. The east section (the Hunter propPrty) was unoccupied (Tr. 59). A double driveway
from Ogden Avenue serviced the defendant's property
and the W eUer property. The evidence was in conflict
as to whether this was divided, or was one large driveway used for both properties. However, two of defendant's witnesses indicated it to be one large driveway. (Tr. 37, 65, Ex. 3).
This situation existed without interruption until
1946 or 1947, when Mr. Hunter, the owner of the east
section, informed defendant he had th'e property surveyed, and that defendant's fence was on Hunter's property. To this defendant replied that when the f'ence
was replaced it would be corrected (Tr. 90). Sometime
thereafter, defendant and her sons replaced the fence
\Vith the present one. In doing so, they placed it on
the smne line as the earlier fence. Nothing further
transpired between defendant and Hunter regarding
the boundary and the Hunter tract remain ed vacant.
1

When plaintiff purchased his property, this reconstructed fence was perhaps 8 feet short of the tree that
n1arks its present terminus. Plaintiff testified there
was nothing in this 8 foot space, and defendant testified
that son1e wire was strung from the end of the fence
to the tree (Tr. 9, 62). This vacant area was then filled
by a section of picket from defendant's rear fence.
When plaintiff acquired the property in 1951, no
survey had been made. Plaintiff removed the house on
the Weller section and began construction of his commercial structure. In 1953 or 1954, plaintiff erected the
garage on his property and added the fence shown in
3
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defendant's Exhibits 1-7. This fence ran easterly from
the Ogden A venue sidewalk to the west end of defendant's fence, and was in place from 6 months to a year
or better (Tr. 20, 54). During this same period of
time plaintiff had his first survey made, which showed
the fen~e south of the true boundary (Tr. 20-21). Thereafter, the fence erected by plaintiff was removed, plaintiff and defendant had discussions as to location of the
boundary, and the matter culminated in the filing of
this suit May 14, 1957 (Tr. 21, 22, 58).
Trial was had without a jury before th!e Hon. John
F. Wahlquist on October 15, 1959, and the court resolved
the issues in favor of defendant and against plaintiff
and entered judgment thereon October 28, 1959. From
this judgment plaintiff takes this appeal.
III.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
1. The evidence does not support the findings of

fact or the judgment.

IV.
ARGUMENT
This proceeding is an equitable one, and this court
should review both the law and the facts as reflected
in the record. Tripp v. Bagley. 74 Wash. 57, 276 Pac.
913.
Unless a boundary by acquiescence was established
subsequent to plaintiff's purchase of these properties
4
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in 1951, each section of plaintiff's property must be
considered individually in attempting to evaluate the
evidence supporting the fenceline. It is thus important
to weigh the evidence of acquiescence since 1951.
It is without dispute that the fence has there existed, and that defendant occupied her premises up to
the fence line during this period. It would also seem
that prior to the survey (circa 1954), plaintiff acquiesced in the line indicated by the fence; however, upon
learning of the true location of the boundary, plaintiff
could and did no longer acquiesce in the fence line to
establish the boundary. Factually he did not acquiesce
because the evidence shows he took down the fence he
erected, but beyond this, as a matter of law he could
not acquiesce. See 3 Utah Law Review, Boundary by
.ArCJniescence, at Page 510, where the author states:
"It is clear that actual knowledge of the true
boundary prevents uncertainty",
citing Tripp vs. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 913,
wherein this court stated at Page 70:
"We further remark that, if adjoining land owners acquiesce in a division line other than the
true line, with knowledge of the location of the
true line and with design and purpose of thereby
transferring a tract of land from one to the other,
such acquiescence alone will not operate as a
conveyance. Land cannot be conveyed fron1 one
person to another by merely a change in possession, even though such change in possession continues for a long period of time."
If any acquiescence can be claimed against plaintiff, therefore, it is only from the time he purchas'ed,
5
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1951, to the time of this knowledge (circa 1954), and
falls far short of the period of acquiescence required.
Thus in order to establish acquiescence, it will be necessary to go back prior to plaintiff's ownership and since
the property was then in two separate tracts, each must
be considered separately.
First, the Hunter tract, which adjoins defendant's
property for 49.5 feet. The uncontradicted evidence
shows that from November 1937 to the present a fence
existed dividing the two properties; that the fence
started on the east point of the common boundary and
ran westerly with a southern bias into the Hunter tract.
No evidence was offered concerning the origin of this
fence, and up until plaintiff's purchase in 1951, the
property was vacant and unoccupied. While the point
has never been rul'ed on directly, we think that under
Utah law no boundary by acquiescence can be established
during a period of time when the other property is
vacant and occupied. The recent cas'e of Ekberg v. Bates
121 Utah 123, 239 Pac. 2nd 205, lays down the foundation of the doctrine as follows:
"In Brown v. Milliner 120 Utah 16, 232 P. 2nd 202,
207, which is the latest exp:;_·ession of this court
in a case involving a boundary line dispute, many
of the cases decided by this coul·t on that question
are reviewed and we reaffinn the doctrine that
the owners of adjoining tracts whose true boundary lines are unknown, in dispute or uncertain
may by parol agreement ·establish boundarY lines
which are binding on themselves and their snccessors in interest but concluded that it did not
apply to the facts in that case. We also said
tlterein '* * * that in the absence of eYidence that
6
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the owners of adjoining property or their predecessors in interest ever expressly agreed as to
the location of the boundary between them, if they
have occupied their respective premises up to an
open boundary line visibly marked by monuments,
fences or buildings for a long period of time and
mutually recognized it as the dividing line between them, the law will imply an agreement fixing the boundary as located, if it can do so consistently with the facts appearing, and will not
permit the parties nor their grant~ees to depart
from such line, * * * ''. (Italics added)
This statement of the law is quoted in 3 Utah Law
Review, Boundary by Acquiescence at Page 505, and
the author lists as one of the four el'ements of the
doctrine "Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by monuments, fences or buildings." (Italics added)
The case of Hummell vs. Young, 1 Utah 2nd 237,
265 Pac. 2nd 410, is perhaps most clearly in point on
the question of occupation up to the fence line. In that
case the fence was erected by a party when the land on
the other side was unoccupied, and was done without
consultation with the other owner. The possibility of an
express agreement as to fence location was thus excluded; and further, this evidence left no room to imply
such an agreement.
The Court said that the case was similar to H ante
Owners Loan Corporation v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141
P. 2d 160, in which case the fence was ;erected at a time
when a common owner had the land on both sides of
the fence, thus leaving no room for the implication of an
agreen1ent fixing the boundary. We submit the evidence
7
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regarding the Hunter tract falls directly under the
holding of the Hummel case, since the fence relied on
was erected and the claimed acquiescence occurred while
the Hunter tract was vacant and unoccupied.
The evidence is substantially different on the Weller
tract. This tract was occupied from the time defendant
originally purchased until the time suit was filed. The
time requirement of the doctrine would seem to he satisfied. However, there are several other facts here which
seem sufficient to resist application of the doctrine.
First is the point that since defendant in 1946 knew
the fence was off line on the Hunter boundary, she also
krrew it was off on the Weller property and therefore
there could be no acquiescence after that time, for reasons previously submitted, namely, that knowledge of the
true line precludes uncertainty, and uncertainty is essential to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence.
Secondly, plaintiff earnestly contends that the fence
in existenc'e between the Weller tract and defendant from
1937-1951 was not sufficient to constitute "a visible line
marked definitely by monuments, fences or buildings".
The Weller lot is 66 feet wide along defendant's land.
The only time the fence has extended farther west than
it presently is, was a period of about 1¥2 years immediately after defendant's purchase of the property. During this 1¥2 year period some of defendant's evidence
showed the fence to within 12 feet of the sidewalk, but
defendant herself (Tr. 40, Exs. 2 and 3) and her witnesses (Tr. 33, 79) placed it farther east than that.
Also it is undisputed that the fence was several feet
short of the tre'e it presently connects with at the time
8
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plaintiff purchased and for some undisclosed time prior
thereto.
The sum total is that from 19·39-1954 the farthest
extension of the fence was to the tree 30 feet short of
the western boundary. Thus of the 66 feet, 36 feet was
fenced and 30 feet unfenced at all times, with no visible
marker dividing th'e property on the unfenced portion.
A little over one-half of the area was fenced, and this
was on a bias rather than an east-west line. It is interesting to note that the first solid fence post in the
ground is located 41.5 f:eet east of the west boundary,
approxi1nately the location that plaintiff testified the
fence terminated when he purchased his property.
(Ex. C.)
Defendant relies on testimony to the 'effect that
the extension of the fence line would approximately
bisect the double driveway at the curb to establish a fence
line. This driveway is shown in Ex. 3, and there is no
marking of any kind upon it to indicate where the
boundary is claimed to be. It is difficult to tell from
looking at it where the center of the driveway is. We
submit the testimony shows that as to this westernmost
area of the adjoining properties, not only was there no
"visible line definitely marked" but on the contrary
both neighbors were using it in common for an access
drive!
One further point that should be considered is
this : The western end of the fence was destroyed by defendant's son driving a vehicle in th'e driveway next
to the house, (Tr. 81). The true boundary is only 7
ft. 9 inches from the Allen home (Ex. C). The fence
corresponds with the true boundary on the east and
9
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moves into plaintiff's property only as it moves westerly.
We think this is strong evidence that the fence is
in its present position not because adjoining landowners
agreed on the boundary in such position, but because
a fence along the true boundary would not allow vehicles
room to use the driveway between the fence and the
house on the Allen property. It would appear that the
fence was originally placed on the true line (the fact
that the east end of the fence is directly on the true
line would indicate the true boundary was known at the
time it was erected). We think this is strong evidence
that the fence was never originally placed there as a
boundary, but was placed on the true line; that as motor
vehicles and trucks were used in defendant's driveway
of n'ecessity the fence was broken down and moved to
the south in order to permit these vehicles access along
the driveway. The fence was gradually 'bent' to the
south and was replaced or rebuilt along the lines of the
fence as moved. What else accounts for one end being
right on survey and the other a substantial distance off¥
Of course, this argument is to some extent conjecture,
but we submit it fits the facts in evidence far better
than the assumption or implication that the adjoining
land owners ever agreed to its present location as a
boundary.
The foundation of the doctrine of Boundary by
Acquiescence is set out in Glenn vs. Whitney, 116 Utah
267, 209 Pac. 2d 257, where this court said:
"The theory under which a boundarv line is established by long acquiescence along an existing
fence line is founded on the doctrine that the
10
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parties erect the fence to settle some doubt or
uncertainty which they may have as to, the location of the true boundary, and to compromise
th'eir differences by agreeing to accept the
fence line as the limiting line of their respective
lands. The mere fact that a fence happens to be
put up and neither party does anything about
it for a long period of time will not establish it
as the true boundary."
Further amplification is found in Brown v. Milliner,
120 Utah lG, 232 Pac. 2d 202:
"In Holrnes v. Judge, supra, we declared that the
doctrine of boundary by acquiescence 'rests upon
sound public policy, with a view of preventin~
strife and litigation concerning boundaries' and
that 'while the interests of society require that
title to real estate shall not be transferred from
the owner for slight cause, or otherwise than by
law, these same interests dernand that there shall
be stability in boundaries'. However in that case
we were careful to mark off the limits of the rule.
Said the Court: 'We do not wish to be understood as holding that the parties may not clai:rr.
to the true boundary, where an assumed or agreeo
boundary is located through mistake or inadvertence, or where it is clear that the line as located
was not intended as a boundary, and where a
boundary so located has not been acquiesced in
for a long term of years by the parties in interest.'"
Boundary by acquiescence is a limited doctrin'e, and
must not be enlarged beyond its original scope and purpose. Defendant has not met these required standards
of the doctrine as above 'enumerated, but has at most
shown nothing more than a unilateral belief in the fence
11

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

as a boundary. The evidence and the physical facts
militate against a finding of boundary by acquiescence.

v.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
trial court should be reversed, and remanded to the
trial court with instructions to enter judgment as prayed
in plaintiff's complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
Howell, Stine and Olmstead and
Richard W. Campbell,
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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